#### Impact of Rankings and Personalized Recommendations in Marketplaces



#### Akshit Kumar Joint work with Omar Besbes and Yash Kanoria













Develop models and methods to optimize platform operations

- Study the impact of two information provisioning tools
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GALLI	JP <sup>°</sup> Cons	ulting Expertise	Services &	Solutions Lea	arning & Events Ne	ews & Indicators
News	Politics $\checkmark$	Economy 🗸	World $\checkmark$	Key Topics $\checkmark$	Blogs & Opinion $\checkmark$	Media Resources 🗸
On Second Thought: U.S.						
Adults Reflect on Their						
Education Decisions						

#### We have ill-formed preferences



ART SCIENCE		ABOUT	EXPERTISE	CLIENTS	TEAM		STUDENTPOLL	NEWS	CONTACT US
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Schools master's	<b>ONAL UNIVERSITIES</b> is in the National Universities category offer a full range of undergraduate majors and Ph.D. programs.	ors, plus
	Princeton University = #1 in National Universities Harvard University #3 in National Universities	ies (tie)
Ţ	Massachusetts Institute of Technology #2 in National Universities Stanford University #3 in National Universities	RANKINGS
SEE FUI	LL RANKING LIST »	WORLD

RANKINGS

#### We use rankings to decide movies



#### But rankings aren't personalized...

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Many platforms (aim to) provide personalized recos to each user



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There is no supply-side constraints on these platforms

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This is also applicable\* to online platforms like AirBnB, Upwork, etc.

\*the priority order is some random order

#### Personal Recommendation Tools

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#### **CORE, The Academic Explorer**

#### **Course Recommendation Engine**

Select your gender:
Male
ence order for colleges
-
-
•

Recommender Systems for College Recommendations
### Personal Recommendation Tools

<b>CORE, The Academic Explorer</b> Course Recommendation Engine		<b>Electives Chatbot</b> This is based on the starter kit with ReactJS + NextJS + TypeScript. You can <u>download the source code</u> for this Starter Kit from GitHub.
Enter your name:	Select your gender: Male	Contact Us    I am a chat assistant to help you navigate classes offered at CBS. How can I help you?
Provide your preference order for colleges and courses:		Enter your message
Select College 1:	*	<b>k</b>
Select College 2:	•	
Select College 3:	*	
select College 4: Recom	mender Systems for	Chatbots for Course

College Recommendations

Chatbots for Course Recommendations

#### Research Problem

How much value do different information levers rankings & personalized recommendations provide with & without supply side constraints?

### Our solution

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  - ρ: level of heterogeneity in utility
- Assumptions
  - q and  $\phi$  are independent of each other
  - q(i) drawn i.i.d from  $P_q$
  - $\varphi(a, i)$  drawn i.i.d from  $P_{\varphi}$

	q(1)
φ(a, 2)	q(2)
	q(3)
	q(4)

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  - Agents are ordered according to some priority score and have unit demand
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### Information Regimes



#### Preview of Results

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uncap 1/a

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## Summary

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# So long and Thanks for all the fish